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PES, markets and property rights: a comment on Wunder’s 
revisited concept of PES and a proposal of conceptual 
framework 
 
Alain Karsenty*1, Driss Ezzine-de-Blas1 
 
Abstract 
Payments for Environmental Services (PES) are often described as market-based instruments as they 
are used to change relative prices, and therefore to provide incentives. Following the line of thought 
of institutional economists, we argue that a market is a place for the transfer of property rights (the 
right to perform certain actions), beyond the goods and services which are exchanged. We underline 
the need for aclear distinction between “ecosystem services” (services obtained by 
peoplefromnature) and “environmental services” (services rendered by people to other people). 
Against Wunder’s (2015) interpretation, we explain why ecosystem services are, by nature, collective 
or public goods, and as such do not lend themselves to appropriation.We argue also that 
appropriation is a precondition of exchanges, even in a service economy, unless admitting that there 
are markets without exchange. In PES there is no transfer of property rights: the holders simply 
freeze or use their ownland development rights. PES embedded into REDD+ projects, which are 
“backedagainst the carbon market”, and PES in which service’s providres are selected through 
auctions: these PES can be analysed as “hybrids” combining a market-based procedure and bilateral 
agreements about setting environmental easements. 
 
Keywords: payment for environmental services, market-based instruments, markets, 
commodification, utilitarianism, incentives. 
Highlights: 
 PES are often described as market-based instruments 
 Distinguishing between ecosysteme service and environmental services clarifies the débate 
 Appropriation is a precondition of exchanges and ecosystem services are not suitable for 
approriation 
 There is no market without exchange, even for markets of services, and what is echanged are 
property rights 
 In PES there is no transfer of property rights, but some PES can be backed against carbon 
markets 
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 “Market-based instruments (…) include payments for ecosystem service provision (PES), 
pollution taxes, cap-and-trade schemes, ecocertification and labelling, and certain capacity 
building measures” (Lockie, 2013). 
 
“…conservation has adopted a number of market-based instruments (MBI), notably 
payments for ecosystem services (PES)” (Carrière et al., 2012) 
 
“Although not necessarily inherent to  the ecosystem services framework, this governance 
agenda has come along with  two associated measures, (1) the economic valuation of 
these services, and (2) the  promotion —and increasing use— of market-based policy tools, 
especially the so-called ‘‘payments for  ecosystem services’’ (Muradian and Rival, 2012)”.  
 
 
These three excerpts reflect the frequentconfusion in the recent literature between “payment for 
ecosystem services” (PES) and market-based instruments (MBIs). Tradable permits, auctions, 
environmental taxes, “green” labels and PES are regularly classified asbelonging to the category of 
“market-based instruments” (MBIs) (Pirard, 2011, Commission of the European Communities, 2007). 
In particular,the widely citedTEEB (The Economics of Ecosystems and Biodiversity) report (TEEB, 
2009), states:“Experienceshowsthatenvironmentalgoalsmaybereached moreefficiently bymarket-
basedinstrumentsthan by regulationalone”. The report also specifies: “Market-based instruments, 
such as taxes, charges or tradable permits can, if carefully designed and implemented, complement 
regulations by changing economic incentives, and therefore the behaviour of private actors, when 
deciding upon resource use” (p. 31).The rationale behind calling such tools “market-based 
instruments” (MBIs) is that they all are used to change relative prices, and therefore encourage 
reliance on the “self-interest” of economic agents who take the decisions. ForStavins (2005), 
“market-based instruments are regulations that encourage behaviour through market signals rather 
than through explicit directives”. This analytical entry point explains why environmental taxes are 
classified as MBIs, although it is hard to see how they rely on a market.  
 
Pirard (2011) argues that the reference to pricing is the common denominator among MBIs, thus 
clearly differentiatingthem from regulatory instruments which rely on prescription. He points out 
that this classification obscures the very different principles underlying the range of instruments 
categorized as MBIs, especially PES. Nevertheless he still uses pricing as the main variable to 
differentiate MBI instruments. This choice explains why PES schemes are classified in different 
categories, with different degrees of closeness to markets: while trading of forest carbon and Coasian 
type agreements both embed PES schemes in their implementation, forest carbon exchange schemes 
are closer to a classical market configuration than agreements between upland and lowland farmers 
to improve the quality and quantity of water.  Nevertheless, the creation of carbon credits and of an 
international platform on which to trade them is not a precondition for the agreement to be 
negotiated, and responds more to a conjunctural choice in a policy context dominated by the belief 
that markets are more efficient than other types of more regulated schemes, e.g. a fund to fight 
deforestation in the case of forests. Corbera et al. (2007) also point to the difference between 
different schemes involving a PES design and conclude that “PES are not actual markets where 
ecosystem services are sold to service buyers” and therefore distinguish between amarket for 
ecosystems services (MES)2 and PES. Other scholars have highlighted the fact that PES do not 
function as a market per se, but have introduced a market-oriented vocabulary and way of thinking in 
the social and policy spheres (Milne and Adams, 2012). To equate incentive instruments (i.e. taxes 
and PES) with MBIs reinforces their separation from  prescriptive regulations. Such a 
contrastsuggests a desirable switch from a bureaucratic and rigid administrative universe to a 
modern one where the free will of individuals, capable of weighing their options and deciding 
accordingly, is emphasized. In a nutshell, it’s bureaucracy versus markets. Calling such a wide range 
of different instruments market-based amounts to promoting an “organizing fiction” of the world – 
sometimes unnoticed by those who relay this language – in which the market is identified as the only 
intelligent alternative to administrative directives for the management of the environment.  
 
In the present paper we explain why pricing is not the right analytical entry point to understand the 
structural difference between PES and markets, this being one of the main sources of confusion in 
the literature when PES are associated with MBIs and commodification. First, the services to be 
regulated (the type of services involved in PES) are properties, like the quality of water or the 
composition of the atmosphere, which cannot be exchanged, only altered or enhanced. Second, 
markets are defined by the transfer of property rights in a competitive setting between suppliers and 
aquirers.We argue that most PES are based on a contractual relationship between actors to 
compensate for avoided land use change, and that this relationship is decoupled from the creation of 
a market, whose aim is to exchange and transfer property rights. The recent tendency to 
equatemarket metaphors (pricing mechanisms and contractual relationships) with genuine markets 
responds to a policy context and a desire to create a tradable commodity and to rank instruments in 
a heirarchyin which MBIs are considered to besmarter than instruments that are prescriptive, i.e.,  
based on constraint.  
 
1. Incentives, relative prices and markets 
According toE.F. Rosenbaum (2000): “Many economists tend to find markets almost everywhere on 
Earth and in history (…). But (…) the market concept is hardly analyzed in depth. Nor are there serious 
attempts to examine empirically where markets exist”. Many different definitions of markets have 
been provided by different economic schools3. Rosenbaum (2000) distinguishes between three sets 
of definitions: (i) observational definitions, “which refer to some empirical phenomenon, often 
together with one or several stylized facts about prices and/or commodities”; (ii) functional 
definitions which “focus on what the market does rather on what, from an empirical point of view, 
the market is”. According tothe functional definition, “the concept of a market is equated with the 
determination of relative prices by demand and supply”, which correspond to the MBIrhetoric 
presented above.  
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For Corbera et al. (2007), “MES must have a well-defined ecosystem service and a well-defined trading 
commodity, and active supply and demand sides must coexist” (p. 366).  
3Hodgson (1988) comments that only a few economists have attempted to define a market while, for most, 
“the market has been taken for granted”. Among these economists, he mentions Cournot, Jevons and Alfred 
Marshall, who provided rather vague definitions (such as the one of Jevons, 1871: “to mean any body of 
persons who are in intimate business relations and carry on extensive transactions in any commodity” – quoted 
by Hodgson, 1988, p.173. 
The third definition Rosenbaum mentions is (iii) astructural definitionwhich draws attention to “the 
underlying and hence not immediately observable structure of a market, emphasising the alleged 
mechanisms and structures that give rise to market phenomena”. Such definitions have been 
favoured by institutional economists who pay attention to history and to the issue of what drives 
institutional change. G.M. Hodgson, a prominent figure in institutional economics, defined the 
market as “a set of social institutions in which a large number of commodity exchanges of a specific 
type regularly take place, and to some extent are facilitated and structured by those institutions. 
Exchange (…) involves contractual agreements and the exchange of property rights, and the market 
consists in part of mechanisms to structure, organize, and legitimate these activities” (Hodgson, 1988, 
p. 174). For institutional economists, whether they are considered to be “old” or “new” 
institutionalists, markets are, above all, a place where legal property rights are exchanged. John 
Commons, who symbolizes “old” institutionalism, states:  “Transactions are the means, under 
operation of law and custom, of acquiring and alienating legal control of commodities, or legal 
control of the labor and management that will produce and deliver or exchange the commodities and 
services, forward to the ultimate consumers” (Commons, 1931). As Coase (1992), who features 
himself as new institutionalist, put it: “… what is traded on the market are not, as often supposed by 
economists, physical entities, but the right to perform certain actions” (p. 717).  Admittedly, the 
market for services is not exactly to the same as the market for commodities: the transfer of 
property rights does not entail a change in the ownership of physical assets, but the transfer by the 
seller of a service of an agreed fraction of the working time to the client. The seller transfers the 
(future) product of his/her labour to the buyer, and exclusively to the buyer (property right). The 
labour market works in the same way, but so does consulting, cutting hair, transporting goods, etc.  
 
According tothis definition, we can agree that emission rights (or catching rights in fisheries) can be 
considered as transferable property rights, in the sense that they allow their holder to undertake 
certain actions and those rights can be exchanged on markets4. Environmental taxes, like any other 
tax, change the relative prices of certain actions and, in this respect, can be compared with emission 
rights. Besides, paying such taxes is the counterpart for performing certain actions, and can therefore 
be considered as property rights. But the main difference concerns the degree of transferability: 
there are no markets for exchanging taxes whereas there are markets for emission permits, tradable 
development rights and “individual transferable quotas” in fisheries5. If pricing were the cornerstone 
of markets (rather than the exchange of rights), it would be difficult to see why penalties entailed by 
prescriptive regulations (for instance, on the payment on the damage caused by pollution) could not 
be classified asMBIs: Even if there are several motivations for compliance with the law, it was argued 
by Gary Becker (1976) and many other scientists of utilitarian thinking, that compliance with the law 
by individuals could be interpreted as deriving from a cost-benefit analysis: agents weigh the 
                                                          
4Vatn (2010) coined “an ideal type of the market” as “a system of voluntary exchange” (p.1246). Unfortunately, 
he focuses on the voluntary dimension of the exchange and does not say exactly what has to be exchanged on 
markets to distinguish between mere “exchanges” and a market. 
5Some authors including Corbera et al. (2007) and Vatn (2010) emphasize the public character of the financing 
of many PES to distinguish them from “standard markets” (Vatn, 2010: 1246). But the involvement of public 
authorities is not sufficient to clearly distinguish between what MBIs are and what they are not. Even the fact 
that the money collected by payments is not “voluntary” (but is collected through a tax on water, for instance) 
does not seem to be a strong enough law to portray PES as non-market instruments. On the other hand, the 
reference to the voluntary dimension would be useful to question equating environmental taxes (which are 
compulsory) and MBIs. 
probability of being caught and punished, and the benefits to be had from breaking the law. “A Fine 
is a Price”, to cite the title of a famous article by Gneezy and Rustichini (2000). 
 
Grouping the above mentioned economic instruments as MBIs on the sole grounds they have an 
impact on pricingthus seems to be a weak argument. Classifying them between incentivesand 
prescriptive seems to be more justifiable, but could also be questioned by the above mentioned 
utilitarian cost-benefit interpretation of “why do people follow a rule?”. In practice, the wide use of 
such a categorization can be explained by the belief that markets are more efficient than 
administrative regulationsin managing environmental services (Gómez-Baggethun et al., 2010).  
 
Markets of services and property rights 
Characterizing markets essentially as transfers of property rights, i.e. social authorization to perform 
certain actions to adopt Coase’s terms, is challenged by analysts arguing that in the markets of 
services there is no transfer of property rights. Yet, Wunder (2015) criticising Karsenty’s 2011 
tentative definition of PES (see infra), argues that the implicit idea that “one can only sell what one 
possesses” is “a generalized misconception” of the economy of services: 
 
“exchange of property rights is usually not required in service trade: a teacher does not own 
the provision of knowledge, a house cleaner has no patented right to cleanliness, and a 
dentist does not own his clients' teeth. Following Shelley (2011), ES instead imply the 
provision of stewardship in ways where humans and nature interact”.  
 
But this argument ignores the exchange itself. Services (environmental or not) are reduced to 
“stewardship” which can be provided without any exchange.Going a step farther and suggesting that 
the services economy is unrelated to markets6, leads to something quite odd:a market without 
exchange. Wunder’s argument suggests that institutional and neo-institutional economists just 
overlooked the economy of services and implicitly referred to the exchange of goods when theorizing 
about markets. Is this right? Another well-known representative of neo-institutionalism, D. North 
(1977:711) put forward the following: “An essential pre-condition for price-making markets is the 
existence of well-defined and enforced property rights over the good or the service7 to be exchanged”. 
Clearly, North considered markets of services, with respect to property rights over the good or the 
service.  
 
Obviously, the (private) teacher does not own the knowledge he/she delivers, but Wunder simply 
disregards the fact that what is transferred exclusively to the payer is the “skilled labour-time” of the 
service’s provider, not the knowledge which is public good, and the provider only “owns” the time 
he/she can decide to allocate to a client. The exchange is “skilled labour time against money”, as 
already analysed by K. Marx who referred to “labour power” as “the aggregate of those mental and 
physical capacities existing in a human being, which he exercises whenever he produces a use-value 
of any description” (Marx, 1867). In general, the qualification is more important than the time 
allocated: the more skilled the labour time dedicated to the service contracted, the higher its value 
(as anyone can verify with top lawyers, famous singers or consultants). Yet, there are other services 
where it is not the skilled labour time that matters but the transfer of a financial guarantee over 
                                                          
6An arguments, however, not advanced by Wunder 
7Our emphasis 
time, e.g. the insurance market. The contract anticipates the possibility of damage occurring which 
will be covered by the insurance scheme, hence a portion of the money owned by the insurance 
company will be transferred to the victim of the damage. The only market situation in which one can 
sell something she/he does not possess (yet) is through “short selling” on financial markets. Short 
selling means selling an asset that is not currently owned by the seller who will manage to own it at 
the agreed date of the transfer for delivering the asset to the buyer. But even there, ownership of 
the asset must be effective the day the transaction occurs. 
 
Remember that the starting point of our analysis is that PES schemes cannot be analysed as markets, 
since they lack several conditions included in the definition of markets such as competition, 
substitutability of the good or service and, more basically,there is a contractual agreement to 
suspend – but not to transfer – property rights. This is for “land-use restricted” PES. In “assets-
building PES”, there is an exchange of “labour time against reward” for enhancing ecosystem 
services, which could suggest that such peculiar PES would qualify as “markets”. But this would be 
misguiding. A market entails “alienation” of the fruit of the (skilled) labour, i.e. its transfer to the 
payer. Yet, the environmental service rendered through assets building (such as planting trees) is 
performed on the land owned or controlled by the labourer, and the trees planted belong to 
him/her, not to the payer. This characteristic distinguishes PES from “out-growing” schemes 
implemented by companies who sometimes claim they run PES schemes since they pay the farmer to 
plant trees (e.g. shea butter trees), on his own land – but with a contractual agreement for the 
company to pay an initial subsidy and the farmer to give the company exclusive purchasing rights to 
the fruits or the wood produced by these trees. The assets-building PES does not involve alienation 
of the physical assets created, which remain the property of the labourer. Furthermore, since 
ecosystem services are, by nature, collective or public goods, they are not “transferred” and should 
be considered as positive externalities someone has paid for. 
 
2. What are PES about?  
 
We agree with Wunder (2015) about the usefulness of proposing ideal-types for clarifying and 
understanding conceptual constructs which facilitate the recognition of regularities in the diversity of 
some social phenomenon, which in practice cannot be ‘imprisoned’ in narrow definitions. 
Distinguishing among composite realities and classifying embedded phenomena are the essence of 
intellectual endeavours.  
 
We will start with a clarification about the notions of “environmental” and “ecosystem” services. 
Both are often used interchangeably to refer to PES. According to the Millennium Ecosystem 
Assessment, “ecosystem services” can be defined as services that nature renders people (“Ecosystem 
services are the benefits people obtain from ecosystems” (MEA, 2005). Although, from an economic 
perspective, one can question the relevance of combining “the provisioning services” (which are 
about goods for which there are markets and, thus, market prices) and “regulating services” (which 
can be considered as positive externalities, that is without markets); it would be difficult to ignore 
this MEA framework that has gained so much importance in literature and policy debates. 
 
If ecosystem services are benefits obtained from nature, we suggest that PES are related to 
“environmental services”, which can be understood as remunerations for services rendered by 
people to other people for the maintenance or the improvement of a given ecosystem service. Most 
of the analysts disregard this distinction or argue against it, considering PES as a joint production of 
amenities by the combined biophysical and socioeconomic processes (e.g. Wunder 2015: 6). This 
reluctance to separate ecological functioning and human actions affecting nature is probably 
associated to the proposed “new paradigm” (retrieving ancient cosmogonies) that sees the human 
being as part of the ecosystem (cf. Larrère&Larrère, 1997). However, following Teyssèdre et al. 
(2005)who urged scientists to distinguish between “ecological service” and “economic service” 
(specifying that “maintaining a scarce ecological service corresponds to an economic service”), we 
argue that a distinction should be made between, say, the pollination activity of insects (referred to 
as an ecological service by biologists) which can occur without any human action and the making of 
hives or the planting of flowers that will favour the activity of the pollinizing insects. The same can 
apply for water: on the one hand, sedimentation that occurs in ecosystems may filtrate and regulate 
water flows naturally, without human intervention while, on the other hand, land use activities may 
contribute to the maintenance or the enhancement of this natural ecological function. The frequent 
uncertainties concerning the outcome of a given land use in a specific site (i.e. keeping or planting 
trees for enhancing water quality, that can be the expected environmental service) and the result in 
terms of ecosystem services (i.e. the actual water quality) should ascertain the pertinence of 
distinguishing between the notions, despite the strong interaction between human actions and 
ecosystem functioning. 
 
Distinguishing “services rendered by nature” and “services rendered by people”, even if interactions 
are frequent between both, is critical in dealing with the issue of commodification. Ecosystem 
services are by nature collective goods (non-rivalry) or public goods (non-excludability and non-
rivalry) since they are qualities associated with a certain state of the ecosystem (for instance the 
quality of the water from a watershed, or the quality of the natural habitat which favours 
biodiversity) and which cannot be exchanged. 
 
3. PES and property rights 
 
Characterising ecosystem services as a collective or public good by nature is not widely accepted. 
Wunder (2015), discussing the Muradian et al. (2010) tentative definition of PES referring to “the 
social interest” (see supra), argue that “not all environmental services are public” and specify: “some 
are club goods *…+, and yet others are fully private (e.g. when the only downstream user is a private 
brewery)”. For reasons exposed above, Wunder does not distinguish between ecosystem and 
environmental services, but in the last example implicitly refers to the quality of water that is 
somehow ‘appropriated’ by the brewer. This quality is, for us, the ecosystem service that can be 
rendered without human intervention and that can be also maintained and enhanced through 
environmental services (adoption of a given land use). In this example, the quality of the water is not 
appropriated by the brewer but is likely to be a common pooled resource shared by the inhabitants 
of the watershed drawing from the same aquifer. The fact that the brewery is able to take advantage 
of this quality for its private production does not mean its owner is able to deprive its neighbours of 
the benefits they will get from access to high quality water8.  
                                                          
8The same occurred in the well-known example of Vittel in France: the company paid the farmers to make 
major changes in farming practices e.g. avoid the use of pesticides, and diminish nitrate levels in the water 
 
The argument is that some environmental services (generally referred to as ‘ES’) can be privately 
owned is also raised with regard to pollination and soil fertility. But, generally, these services are 
different from those associated with PES. Some beekeepers, for instance, move their hives by truck 
along the road and rent pollination services to famers (by parking the hives in the orchards for a few 
days). This clearly involves a market transaction; the farmer buys the pollination service since the 
bees are left on his land. But is this socio-economic practice the same as the one involved in PES? In 
this example (as for “fertilising contracts” practised in some rural areas between croppers and 
pastoralists), the service is rendered on the land belong to someone else, while in PES literature, the 
situations analysed refer to payments for actions to maintain or enhance ecosystem services on the 
lands owned (or controlled, in case of collective property) by the provider of the environmental 
service. A gardener planting trees on a municipal or private estate, that is not his own, is a salaried 
worker, not the recipient of a PES.  
 
PES are proposed to those who have rights over lands and their resources. The payments are made 
for not using these property rights or using them in a different way. In sum, all the transactions 
involving ecosystems are not PES according to the framework for the ideal type of PES that has 
gradually emerged from the literature.  
 
4. Environmental services and markets: on the issue of definitions 
 
What about environmental services? Does paying for environmental servicesmake them synonymous 
with market-based relationships?  Let us review some of the main tentative definitions of PES. PES 
are often described as MBIs in the literature. The definition of PES proposed by Wunder in 2005, and 
extensively quoted since then, has certainly contributed to this classification: “a voluntary 
transaction in which a well-defined environmental service (ES) or a form of land use likely to secure 
that service is bought by at least one ES buyer from a minimum of one ES provider, if and only if the 
provider continues to supply that service (conditionality)”. This definition uses market terminology 
(buying and, implicitly, selling), which implies that the services have been appropriated prior to the 
transaction (one can only sell what one possesses).  Alternative definitions,whichavoid linking PES to 
a market-orientedview of the world,have also been proposed. Karsenty (2011), suggested that “a PES 
is a payment to an agent for services provided to other agents - wherever they may be in space and 
time - by means of a deliberate action aimed at preserving, restoring or increasing [an] environmental 
service agreed by the parties”. Wunder (2015:6) criticized this definition, pointing, rightly, to the 
issue deriving from the causal circularity associated with the reference to the sole notion of 
environmental service. Indeed, since making this first proposal, we have explored what could be 
identified as the distinction between environmental and ecosystem services. Replacing 
“environmental service agreed by the parties” by “ecosystem service” would avoid the imprecision 
caused by the circularity of the definition.  
 
Tacconi (2012) underlined the importance of additionality in the PES definition he proposes (“A PES 
scheme is a transparent system for the additional provision of environmental services through 
conditional payments to voluntary providers”, p. 35), as did Sommerville et al. (2009, p. 34). Both 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
table. Today, Vittel, the farmers and the local inhabitants benefit from pure water, although the company 
benefits most financially. 
definitions are influenced by the conviction that PES should be efficient, i.e. not pay for “business-as-
usual”. In practice, such criteria have not always been respected, in particular in government PES, like 
in Costa Rica, where the government paid landholders for business-as-usual (Pfaff et al., 2007; 
Pattanayak et al., 2010), simply because they were owners of forested land and they committed to 
keep it, without considering whether (or not) they inccured any opportunity costs. Another useful 
definition was proposed by Muradian et al., (2010, p. 1205) who considers “PES as a transfer of 
resources between social actors, which aims to create incentives to align individual and/or collective 
land use decisions with the social interest in the management of natural resources”. As pointed out 
by Farley and Costanza (2010) “most PES schemes actually pay for land uses associated with 
generating the service” (p. 2062).  
 
This emphasis on land use has major consequences for our conceptualization of PES, and leads to the 
frequent distinction between “landuse restricting” and “assetbuilding” PES (Wunder, 2005). Although 
the former can be categorised as negotiated easements for which compensation can be received 
(suspension of development rights), the latter are related to (remunerated) efforts invested in 
planting trees, fences or changing polluting agricultural practices.  What qualifies them as PES is the 
fact that the efforts are focussed on the property (individual or collective) of the recipients (which 
distinguish the scheme from the case of a municipal gardener)9. We argue that the term market-
based relationships isnot appropriate to describe PES, while there are some cases where PES can be 
organized throughcompetition to select service providers, such as inverted auctions. And the fact 
that there are markets for carbon credits generated by certain types of forestry projects (CDM or 
REDD+) does not mean the landusers, whose practices are directlyresponsible for carbon emissions, 
are selling environmental services. 
 
5. PES and the markets of “carbon credits” 
 
Let us consider the case of payments for maintaining endemic biodiversity through habitat 
conservation or species monitoring (Wunder and Alban, 2008; Clements et al., 2010; Sommerville et 
al., 2010). By definition, endemic species are not substitutable and looking for equivalence (a metric) 
would not make sense. Nevertheless, some PES aremore amenable to metrics. The maintenance or 
enhancement of the quality and amount of water – the most frequent PES scheme – can be assessed 
using different metrics (microbiological composition, turbidity, concentration of inorganic 
compounds, litres of water per second).But, unlike CO2, which has a global impact regardless of 
where it is emitted, in this case, there are no polluting rights to beexchanged. The physical nature of 
the environmental service of water regulation and the specific links its creates between the provider 
and the user do not allow for a transfer in its canonical sense, nor for competition between several 
possible users and providers. As Wunder and Vargas (2005) put it, a payer who “thinks the price for 
watershed protection charged by upstream farmers is too high, ususally cannot just go for the next 
three watersheds for better offers”. In these circumstances, commodification is simply not possible, 
and any attempt to create ecosystem marketplaces is prevented by the very nature of the services 
and the impossibility of allocating property rights on them. 
                                                          
9Here, we do not consider “transferable development rights “(Chomitz, 2004) as PES, inasmuch they are based 
on prior capping of property rights by law, and are not directed towards the provision of more ecosystem 
services but rather a reduction in the social cost of a given environmental target. Neither do we consider 
certification as a PES, since the price premium (when there is one) for the products is largely disconnected from 
the service (indirect inventive). 
 
If an environmental service can be expressed as a relatively homogenous unit, like the CO2 equivalent 
which can be used as a metric for a reduction in greenhouse gas emissions, then a tradable asset can 
be created (the “carbon credit”), and this credit (and only this credit) can be echanged on a market 
for emission permits. But such a good is no longer an environmental service: the service which is 
provided is the reduction in carbon emissions; and it is contingent, i.e. it can be rendered without the 
issuance of “carbon credits”. A carbon credit is produced bya standardized and quite costly 
procedure (set by voluntary standards) and separated from the underlying contract (if there is a 
contract) in which a land holder agrees to perform a negotiated land management activity. And, 
unlike environmental services which are “externalities”, carbon credits are, indeed, subject to 
appropriation. 
 
The fact that the promoters of REDD+ projects can sell “carbon credits” (offsets) derived from the 
estimated avoided or captured emissions entailed by the prevention of an alternative land use option 
does not alter the nature of - or support for - the transaction (the land-use agreement) concluded 
between the land users and the project/promoter. Furthemore, through carbon measurements, 
setting, certification, and marketing reference emission levels and MRV (Monitoring, Reporting and 
Verification) operations, there is a specific prodution process of the tradable assets (the carbon 
credits) which, although these depend on the field context, makes them a genuine creation by the 
project promoter (Karsenty et al., 2014) which is contingent to the PES itself, i.e. payment for the 
land-use agreement10. And the carbon credit is not the environmental service: it is, in the best case, a 
quasi-monetary sign acknowledging a certain amount of emission reduction deriving from a bilateral 
land use agreement between the project promoter and the direct land users – those who provide the 
service of reducing emissions (see figure 1). In sum, it is difficult to see any tangible commodification 
of nature in such transactions which do not entail the transfer of property rights, even though one 
might consider such PES are “backedagainst”11 the carbon markets without being market-based. 
 
                                                          
10A parallel can be drawn with the principle of patents: as recalled by a 2013 decision of the US Supreme Court 
(n° 12-398, Myriad Genetics), natural phenomena cannot be patented (and are consequently not marketable), 
neither is a process reciting a law of nature patentable, unless that process has additional features (genetic 
modification of a living organism, for instance) . The additional feature, in the case of a PES, is the creation of 
“certificates of emission reductions” commonly referred to as carbon credits. 
11
 This term is suggested by an expression used by R. Pirard (2013) in French (“adossés aux marchés”) about 
PES 
Figure 1: Schematic diagram of the articulation of a PES component and the carbon credit 




In PES (i.e. voluntary) schemes, land use rights are frozen by the PES recipient as long as payments 
continue, and not transferred. A transfer of property rights would require other institutional 
arrangements, such as a lease, concession or purchase. But, in such cases, this would imply a shift 
from PES to a very different situation, which has been referred to as “green grabbing” by some 
authors includingFairhead et al. (2012). Like some PES, such operations can be driven by the 
opportunities for profit offered by the development of the carbon market, or the desire to 
compensate for environmental damage through land acquisition (or long-term renting) for 
conservation (e.g. “conservation concessions”). But these operations are fundamentally different 
from PES in the sense they are based on a permanent or temporary (lease) transfer of property 
rights12. In addition, renting the land, even for a short period, often implies physical intrusion by the 
taker and displacement of former land users, which is not the case with PES.  
 
6. The case for hybrids: selection through auctioning 
 
In “asset-building” PES schemes, when the time invested by land users in ecosystem restoration and 
planting the land they control is to be paid for, the basis of the payment is the working time invested, 
possibly bonified by the species planted (or their location). Introducing competition in the supply of 
labour is limited by the number of land users/owners who are called to work on their own estates. 
                                                          
12On this point, we agree with Sommerville et al’s (2009) analysis that “any intervention where one-time 
property rights are transferred to another group, would not likely be considered as PES approaches” (p. 34).  
But if a service payer is looking for an environmental service which consists in planting 10,000 trees 
of a given species in a given area (to enhance the ecosystem service of pollination, for instance), 
he/she can launch a call for tendersto select farmers who will commit themselves to planting the 
trees on their property at the least cost. Similar competitive procedures can be envisaged for PES 
which restrict landuse, and some current payment schemes use inverse auctioning to select the 
service providers in some countries, notably in the USA and Australia (Latacz-Lohmann and Schilizzi, 
2005): if the payer believes the ecosystem service (a quality threshold) can be renderered with a 
minimum number of landusers conserving wetlandson their property or conserving the plant cover 
on the uplands they control, the payer can select them using a reverse auction procedure.  
 
In such a case, a market-based procedure for selecting the environmental service providerstakes 
place, but this fact does not end the debate on whether the instrument is marketbased or not. 
Lapeyre and Pirard (2013) ask, “what should be considered as an instrument: the entire agro-
environmental scheme or just the reverse auction?”. In this case, the PES could be analyzed as 
“hybrid” arrangements (Ménard, 2004), similar to what Vaissière and Levrel (2015) proposed for 
biodiversity mitigation banking. For Ménard (2004:351), hybrids “rely on partners who maintain 
distinct property rights and remain independent residual claimants”. The composite nature of this 
scheme, that uses market-based procedures but does not entail the transfer of property rights, set 
the stage for hybrid arrangements in which some PES are much closer to the market than others. 
 
Will most PES in the future be managed through such hybrid arrangements? It is interesting that 
auctioning is favoured by economists for reason of efficiency (see Munoz Pina et al.), but that 
selecting the providers through auctioning could lead to the opposite result. Selecting the lowest 
bidder tends to mean selecting landowners with zero or very low opportunity costsfor conserving 
portions of their estates. As Blackmore et al. (2013:12) stated in the context of Australia, 
“Additionality of outcomes may be of concern in Australian [conservation tender] programs [that] 
may be failing to achieve biodiversity benefits greatly in excess of those that would have been 
achieved in any case. Moreover, this finding is in line with the limited additionality observed in 
environmental stewardship programs in the United Kingdom (Jones et al., 2010)”. 
 
In most cases,selectinga small number ofproviders of environmental services is not the best way to 
achieve the objective of preserving or enhancing a threatened ecosystem service: the conservation 
of endangered species, for instance, needs the broadcooperation of farmers and other land users, 
not the selectionof some of them. Climate change mitigation requires huge efforts in all sectors all 




It is striking how both unconditional advocates of market solutions, on one hand, and authors who 
are more attached to public regulations on the other, classify instruments as different as transferable 
permits, taxes and PES in the very same category of market-based instruments. Such a classification is 
used either to praise the instrument in the name of its alleged efficiency, or the contrary, to refuse it 
as a neoliberal solution for commodifying nature. Both arguments can be contested.Here our aim 
wasto exemplify the use and misuse of the “market-based” concept through a review of institutional 
economists’definitions of what a market actually is, and what is exchanged on them. Goods or 
services to be exchanged should be appropriated in advance. By their very nature,ecosystem 
services, i.e. the services rendered by nature, are collective or public goods, the properties of 
ecosystems, and as such cannot be appropriated or exchanged; only modified. What could be the 
subject of market-based relationships are environmental services, i.e. how the services people 
render to other people in return for enhancing ecosystem services through their land-use 
practices,are framed.  
 
Distinguishing “asset-building” and “land-use restriction” PES can helpgrasp the different 
relationships such schemes have with markets. In both types, providers can sometimes be selected 
through a competitive procedure (auction) which still might not justify referring to the entire scheme 
as market-based, but may be analysed as a hybrid form between market-based instruments and 
bilateral agreements often related to the setting of environmental easements. When payments 
reward the work time invested by a farmer in planting trees or building fences on his/her own land, 
there is a monetary relationship for what remains a bilateral agreement with no transfer of property 
rights. This would be very different for out-growing plantation schemes, where the investor acquires, 
by contract, the exclusive righttopurchase the future production. On the other hand, at landscape 
level, it is still possible to select environmental service providers through competitive bidding 
(reverse auctioning), even though, in practice, enhancing threatened ecosystem services often 
requires the broadest possible collaboration rather than selection. Like most “land-use restriction” 
PES, asset-building PES do not entail transferring property rights from landholders to environmental 
service users –land-use rights are voluntarily suspended but not transferred, even temporarily. This is 
a good reason for not confusing this subset of PES (the one most people usually have in mind) with 
genuine MBIs.  
 
It is also surprising to see such wide acceptance of markets equated with incentives –even though 
both change relative prices, especially by authors who describe themselves as critical vis-à-vis 
“mainstream” economic theory, which generally refers to the neoclassical economy and its variants. 
We argue that this interpretation masks an ideological attempt to introduce a hierarchy – and not 
simply a distinction – between (allegedly) smart and efficient (market) instruments and (still 
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